[EN] 2026-11-03 | Transfer Is Not the Finish Line: Keeping Tuberculosis Care Connected Through Disasters

Reading patient counts alongside management shares, and examining how hospitals, public health services and EMS can confirm care after transfer.

SCH 재난의학센터 분석 칼럼 / SCH Disaster Medicine Center — Analysis
Reading patient counts alongside management shares, and examining how hospitals, public health services and EMS can confirm care after transfer.
Three news items and the continuity of care
The success of disaster response cannot be measured only by the number of people transported from the scene. Another test is whether someone already receiving treatment can continue that care the day after evacuation. A hospital and a public health centre may each record their work as complete while the patient's next appointment disappears between them. Korea's experience with public–private tuberculosis care raises this concern. This column does not report a new disaster. It examines an established care pathway through the lens of disaster preparedness.
On 3 November 2026, the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency announced an evaluation meeting for its public–private mix tuberculosis programme. The agenda addresses achievements since national expansion and care adapted to patients' circumstances, including those of older people and foreign nationals. Public–private mix, or PPM, connects clinical care in hospitals with community support through public health centres. The long-term decline described in the release is important policy news, but the entire decline cannot be attributed to a single programme. Nor is this announcement a report of a new outbreak.[1]
Internationally, WHO announced on 2 November an Emergency Medical Teams Global Meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The published meeting dates are 3–5 November, with national team readiness and coordination among the main topics. Emergency medical teams organize personnel and equipment to support clinical care during disasters and health emergencies. This is news about a meeting and its agenda; it should not be read as evidence that the discussions have concluded or that improvements in field response have already been demonstrated.[2]
A WHO announcement about Liberia, published on 2 November, describes an earlier field visit. The mission took place on 19–23 October in Lofa, Bong and Margibi counties. WHO examined epidemic preparedness alongside routine services and reported challenges involving supplies, personnel and referral systems. The publication date differs from the assessment period. A preparedness assessment does not itself establish a new Ebola outbreak in Liberia, and this column does not treat observations from the visit as nationally representative statistics for health facilities.[3]
These items do not share a single cause. Korea's programme concerns the evaluation of established treatment support; the global meeting concerns emergency clinical assistance; the Liberian mission examined conditions in the field. They nevertheless raise a common disaster medicine question: when different organizations take responsibility for a patient, who confirms that the next organization has actually taken over? Applying that question to Korean public data and research reveals operational issues that deserve attention alongside the overall scale of resources.
Disasters disrupt more than health
The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommends including continuity of tuberculosis treatment in public health emergency plans, including when people are displaced or routine services are interrupted. Its guidance includes keeping patient and staff contact information available to one another and communicating service changes to partner organizations. This provides an official basis for including prolonged treatment in disaster preparedness. It does not mean that US administrative arrangements should be copied directly into Korea. Decisions about prescriptions or treatment delivery remain with the responsible clinical team.[4]
From this perspective, continuity means more than the availability of medication. Someone must know the current care plan, the patient must be able to reach that person, and the necessary clinical encounters must take place. A hospital building can remain intact while transport disruption or a caregiver's evacuation undermines this sequence. The preparedness proposed here concerns the design of responsibilities and communication so that established care does not disappear between organizations. It is not a method for changing an individual patient's treatment.
A record stating that a patient could not be located can describe different situations. A telephone number may have changed. Treatment may be continuing elsewhere without linked records. Treatment may genuinely have stopped. Treating these states as one problem obscures the appropriate response. Someone whose records are incomplete may need an interfacility inquiry; someone unable to travel may need help reaching care. Before making assumptions about a patient's willingness, the service should establish which part of the connection remains unconfirmed.
Distinguishing organizational task completion from continued treatment

SCH-COLUMN-2026-11-03,EN,TB-CONTINUITY,Analysis